DI04 ABB 模拟量

DI04 ABB 模拟量

工业公司应确保自身网络设计良好，有着防护周全的边界。企业应按ISA IEC 62443标准划分自身网络，保护所有无线应用，部署能快速排除故障的安全远程访问解决方案。公司网络，包括其工业网络基础设施设备，都应列入监视对象范围。运营技术(OT)团队可能会觉得公司的终端受到边界防火墙、专利安防软件、专业协议和物理隔离的防护，可以抵御数字攻击。但事实不是这样的，雇员、承包商和供应链员工将他们的笔记本电脑或U盘带入企业网络时，这些安全防护措施就被绕过了。必须确保所有终端都是安全的，要防止员工将自己的设备接入公司网络。事实上，黑客可以侵入OT环境中基于PC的终端。公司企业还应保护其IT终端不受OT环境中横向移动的数字攻击侵袭。

检测主电路的电压、电流等，当发生过载或过电压等异常时，为了防止逆变器和异步电动机损坏。工业世界联网程度的提升有一个关键问题：如果发生网络攻击且攻击成功，后果不堪设想，比如，网络罪犯入侵计算机系统并切断城市供电或供水。而且，不仅网络犯罪团伙会盯上ICS，民族国家黑客也常将ICS列为攻击敌对国关键基础设施的入口点。正如2017年6月NotPetya数据清除恶意软件爆发所展现的，ICS已经成为网络犯罪的主要目标。然而，很多工控设备都面临安全措施老化过时的风险，需要进行替换或升级。如何应对ICS面临网络攻击风险的事实?公共事业机构该从哪里开始防御这种之前从未考虑过的威胁?

DI04 ABB 模拟量

Industrial companies should ensure that their networks are well designed and have well-protected borders. Businesses should partition their networks according to the ISA IEC 62443 standard, protect all wireless applications, and deploy secure remote access solutions that quickly troubleshoot problems. The corporate network, including its industrial network infrastructure equipment, should be included in the scope of monitoring. The operational technology (OT) team may feel that the company's endpoints are protected against digital attacks by border firewalls, proprietary security software, specialized protocols, and physical isolation. But this is not the case, and when employees, contractors, and supply chain employees bring their laptops or USB sticks into the corporate network, these security safeguards are bypassed. All terminals must be secured and employees must be prevented from accessing their own devices to the company network. In fact, hackers can break into PC-based terminals in an OT environment. Companies should also protect their IT terminals from digital attacks that move sideways in the OT environment.

Detect the voltage, current, etc. of the main circuit, when overload or overvoltage and other anomalies occur, in order to prevent the inverter and asynchronous motor damage. There is a key problem with the increased connectivity of the industrial world: if a cyberattack occurs and is successful, the consequences are catastrophic, for example, if cybercriminals break into computer systems and cut off a city's power or water supply. And it's not just cybercriminal gangs that target ICS, nation-state hackers often use it as an entry point to attack critical infrastructure in hostile countries. As demonstrated by the NotPetya data erasure malware outbreak in June 2017, ICS has become a prime target for cybercrime. However, many industrial control equipment are at risk of aging and outdated safety measures and need to be replaced or upgraded. How to deal with the fact that ICS is at risk of cyber attacks? Where should utilities begin to defend themselves against a threat they had never considered before?